Abstract
In contrast to many of the other societies examined in this book, Taiwan has, over the last decade, been dismantling its authoritarian political structure. This process has had a major impact on judicial decision-making. In this chapter, I examine this impact with an account of the Council of Grand Justices, the de facto constitutional court in Taiwan.1 I first provide a description of the constitution in Taiwan and the role of the Council, and then contrast the approach of the Council to constitutional issues before and after the democratisation process. Finally, I seek to place this development in a theoretical context. I cast doubt on whether Jayasuriya’s ‘East Asian judicial condition’ model (Jayasuriya’s ‘Introduction’, this volume) can be applied to Taiwan. I also reject an analysis based on the ideal of ‘judicial independence’. I offer instead, an interpretation of the Taiwan experience based on an understanding of the relationship between judges and the ‘political-legal community’ with whom they interact.2