Abstract
Many philosophers accept the idea that there are duties to promote or create just institutions. However, are the addressees of such duties supposed to be individuals—the members of the citizenry? What does it mean for an individual to promote or create just institutions? According to the “Simple View,” the citizenry has a collective duty to create or promote just institutions, and each individual citizen has an individual duty to do their part in this collective project. The simple view appears to work well with regard to—you guessed it—“simple” scenarios, but it is riddled with further questions and problems. In this chapter, we raise five problems for the Simple View: (a) we suggest that one cannot develop a view concerning the citizenry’s duty to promote just institutions in isolation from a conception of the ontological relationship between the state and its citizens; (b) we argue that it is not obvious that the citizenry is the right entity to be attributed duties in the first place; (c) we show that a plausible account of collective duties to promote just institutions must not remain silent on the complexities and difficulties amorphous, unorganized groups face vis-à-vis collective action; (d) we contend that without allocation principles for contributory duties amongst the citizenry, or—alternatively—a method for practical deliberation that is action-guiding in collective action contexts, the claim that the citizens have a collective duty to promote just institutions remains moot; and, finally (e) we demonstrate that the problem of reasonable disagreement is a serious threat to a collective duty to promote or create just institutions—it potentially undermines such a duty altogether and allows for conflicting contributory duties amongst the citizenry. We hope that our discussion will ultimately help improve existing theories and conceptual frameworks to better understanding citizens’ obligations to promote justice under non-ideal conditions.