Abstract
This study starts with the observation that the Singapore state, until recently, was a notable example of a strong state. ‘State strength’ in a capitalist society is understood to comprise essentially two characteristics. First, a strong capitalist state will operate with considerable autonomy from social forces, particularly capital-owning classes; second, it will have a considerable capacity to organise social forces according to state-defined criteria. 1 Applying this definition to Singapore, the efficient apparatus inherited by the new administration from the departing British colonial authorities was largely insulated from outside pressure. In the following decades it enjoyed an extraordinary degree of autonomy, providing few opportunities for interest groups to influence decision-making processes. Secondly, in the years after full independence was hurriedly arranged in 1965, this ‘overdeveloped state’ merged with the network of community structures established by the ruling People's Action Party (PAP), intruding deeply into social process and supervising a diverse range of social organisations. The strength of the Singapore state thus relates closely to its thorough penetration by the PAP.