Abstract
The U.S. Army wanted Manila and its port facilities as a base during World War II for striking toward Japan. The problems faced in liberating Manila included U.S. troops' lack of experience and training in urban warfare. There were few guidelines on conducting the campaign. Lacking tactical intelligence, plans were vague and overly optimistic. The invasion force was smaller than required.
Despite these weaknesses, U.S. forces were in a stronger position than the Japanese, who even more critically lacked training, supplies, and military intelligence. Although Japanese officers accepted that they could not win the battle for Manila, they fought to inflict attritional damage and to prevent the port from becoming a major American transportation hub. Gen. Yamashita Tomoyuki wished to keep U.S. forces occupied as long as possible to divert them from Japan.
By late January 1945, U.S. units were being positioned for taking Manila. Gen. Douglas MacArthur pitted the First Calvary Division against the Thirty-Seventh Infantry Division in a race to Manila. In the absence of Japanese aircraft, the advancing columns were mainly hindered by intermittent fire fights, blown bridges, and crowds of celebrating Filipinos. Meanwhile, the Eleventh Airborne Division advanced from the south. The First Calvary crossed the Manila city limits first, arriving on February 3.