Merging animal welfare and conservation codes

Phillip Arena; Ken Johnson

Philosophical propositions about animals can be difficult to reconcile with conventional biology. Conflicting views as key questions have hindered the development of a general code of animal welfare, therefore a study has been made of some of the points of discord. What has emerged is not a more complicated welfare code but a simple conservation code. Pain features prominently in Animal Liberation and Animal Rights literature, where it has been referred to not only as undesirable but even as "evil"(Singer, 1990). To biologists, however, pain is considered essential for survival despite its inherent unpleasantness. Referring to pain as evil inclines biologists to dismiss this claim, and perhaps related propositions as well. Sentience is a key term in Animal Liberation philosophy, reflecting an animal's ability to react to pain and be conscious of it. Animal Liberation philosophers suggest (and Animal Rights proponents imply) that there is a lower biological limit beyond which animals are not sentient. It is necessary to have such a limit to justify clearing land and controlling invertebrate pests on plants providing food for vegetarians; suffering in such animals is held to be meaningless. Conventional biology, on the other hand, depicts animal life ranging from simple to complex across a seamless spectrum. Biologists (Jennings, 1906; Dawkins, 1993) have thrown light on which animals suffer, but offer no unequivocal conclusion. Many biologists still regard the limiting of sentience to certain species as contrived. We have attempted to reconcile philosophical and biological views, mindful of calls to give animals "the benefit of the doubt" in cases of uncertainty (Carpenter, 1980; McFarland, 1985). One obvious solution is to move the boundary of sentience to include simpler species. At first this seems unrewarding because avoiding impositions on every animal is impossible. However if the expectation is expressed simply as concern for all animals, the code translates closely to a plea for "reverence for life" (Schweitzer, 1966). Following that approach, we should accept the necessity for some pain and for impositions on some animals in certain circumstances. We should simply propose that noxious stimulation to animals be minimised. Abandoning the goals of always avoiding pain and of limiting sentience to certain species allows us to discard two biologically unsound propositions while still advocating a general concern for all animals. Philosophical and biological proposals then arguably merge to become a code of compassionate conservation.

Merging animal welfare and conservation codes

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