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Denaturalising phenomenology: Husserl and Heidegger's transcendental account of the knowledge problem
Doctoral Thesis   Open access

Denaturalising phenomenology: Husserl and Heidegger's transcendental account of the knowledge problem

Christopher Edwards
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Murdoch University
2024
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Abstract

Phenomenology Ontology Thought and thinking
The aim of this work is to reaffirm the common task of Husserl and Heidegger’s phenomenology, which is to clarify the question of how being and thinking can be said to correlate, or what I refer to as the knowledge problem. In particular, I advance a critique of recent efforts to naturalise phenomenology, which attempt to make the phenomenological method ‘continuous’ with the natural sciences and, as a result, lose sight of this essential task. This is because the phenomenological clarification of the knowledge problem necessitates a recourse to a domain of investigation that is ‘transcendental’ in the sense that it precedes and exceeds the ‘nature’ of ‘naturalisation.’ Borrowing the term from the work of Steve Crowell, I refer to this domain as the space of meaning, which, strictly speaking, is not a ‘space’ at all—at least not in the sense of a physical space or some kind of otherworldly Platonic realm. It is, rather, the intentional space that lies between thing and thought, and it is precisely this space that phenomenological reflection attempts to determine and clarify. It follows that the sense of ‘knowledge’ that is at issue in ‘the knowledge problem’ is far broader than the epistemological conception that Heidegger explicitly rejects, and is more akin to what Husserl calls intentionality and what Heidegger calls being-in-the-world. In each case, to deny phenomenology access to this space, as naturalisation does, is to problematically redefine the phenomenological project, nullifying its core insights and preventing it from doing the very thing it sets out to do.

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