The paper argues that the standard pro- and anti-Kantian reception of the Critique of Judgment has largely misconstrued the relationship between Part I and Part II of the book by failing to recognize that the former is primarily providing a series of stepping-stones laying the groundwork for the elaboration of reflective-teleological reasoning in Part II. Instead of its dominant reading as foremost relevant to the study of biological nature, the paper distils from the reflective-teleological judgment a universal principle by which we typically interpret any complex set of particulars. As such, the reflective-teleological judgment of 1790 is shown to have done away with interpretive truth, replaced by Kant with the more modest claim of intelligibility.
Details
Title
1790: Kres Prawdy w interpretacji złożonych kontekstów
Publication Details
ER(R)GO, Vol.48, pp.311-330
Publisher
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego
Identifiers
991005703767807891
Copyright
Copyright 2020 Uniwersytet Śląski w Katowicach, Polska