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Journal article
A consideration of what is meant by automaticity and better ways to measure it
Frontiers in psychology, Vol.5, Art. 1537
2015
PMID: 25628582
Abstract
Existing models of exercise behavior are insufficient in predicting outcomes, this point is shown by the relatively high levels of unexplained variance in exercise behavior in meta-analyses of social cognitive theories and models (Chatzisarantis et al., 2003; Hagger and Chatzisarantis, 2009). Researchers are beginning to recognize the importance of implicit, automatic processes in the prediction of health behaviors (Dimmock and Banting, 2009; Keatley et al., 2012, 2013b). The research by de Bruijn et al. (2014) is useful for highlighting the importance of automaticity in exercise behavior. We commend the authors on investigating an important approach to automaticity and exercise behavior. There were, however, some points with which we disagree. We think that the authors do not provide a clear account of what they mean by automaticity–an issue that is essential for the operationalization of the construct. Bargh (1994), for instance, suggested automaticity has four characteristics: awareness, intention, efficiency, and control; it is not clear whether de Bruijn and colleagues automaticity adheres to this. In particular, we contend that the explicit measure of automaticity used in their research is not an optimal way to assess implicit, impulsive processes. Furthermore, we contend that implicit measures, such as the implicit association test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998) would be better positioned as measures of non-conscious processes. The present commentary focuses on pre-behavior automatic associations, which we contend are better assessed by existing implicit measures, rather than during-behavior automatic “processes.”
Taking our perspective from existing implicit theories and models (Strack and Deutsch, 2004; Levesque et al., 2008), we suggest that the authors should clearly outline that their definition of automaticity reflects more conscious processes and self-reporting. De Bruijn and colleagues' proposal that automaticity is determined by the number of times a person has made a decision and goes through the processes does not necessarily imply automaticity. The experience of automaticity in de Bruijn and colleagues' study is self-reported and does not necessarily measure the reality of automaticity; people may report they do things automatically, but, in reality a lot of conscious effort goes into their actions (see Hagger et al., 2014).
Details
- Title
- A consideration of what is meant by automaticity and better ways to measure it
- Authors/Creators
- D. A. Keatley - Curtin UniversityD. K. C. Chan - Curtin UniversityK. Caudwell - Curtin UniversityN. L. D. Chatzisarantis - Curtin UniversityM. S. Hagger - Curtin University
- Publication Details
- Frontiers in psychology, Vol.5, Art. 1537
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media Sa
- Number of pages
- 3
- Identifiers
- 991005554097707891
- Copyright
- © 2015 The Authors
- Murdoch Affiliation
- Centre for Biosecurity and One Health
- Language
- English
- Resource Type
- Journal article
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- Citation topics
- 6 Social Sciences
- 6.73 Social Psychology
- 6.73.447 Racial Identity
- Web Of Science research areas
- Psychology, Multidisciplinary
- ESI research areas
- Psychiatry/Psychology