Journal article
Conviction and punishment: Free press and competitive election as deterrents to corruption
Public Management Review, Vol.11(2), pp.155-172
2009
Abstract
Democratic institutions are not equally effective in curbing corruption. Using a criminal behavior model, this study formulates the hypothesis that corruption offenders, being risk-inclined, are deterred more by conviction-reinforcing democratic institutions than by punishment-reinforcing democratic institutions. Evidence based on cross-country regressions strongly supports this hypothesis, indicating that compared with competitive election, free press is a more effective deterrent to corruption. While shedding light on why corruption remains rampant in some electoral democracies – particularly the illiberal democracies – this study identifies a key to corruption control.
Details
- Title
- Conviction and punishment: Free press and competitive election as deterrents to corruption
- Authors/Creators
- X. Tian (Author/Creator)V.I. Lo (Author/Creator)
- Publication Details
- Public Management Review, Vol.11(2), pp.155-172
- Publisher
- Taylor & Francis
- Identifiers
- 991005540652707891
- Copyright
- © 2009 Taylor & Francis
- Murdoch Affiliation
- Murdoch University
- Language
- English
- Resource Type
- Journal article
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- Citation topics
- 6 Social Sciences
- 6.10 Economics
- 6.10.82 Finance-Growth Nexus
- Web Of Science research areas
- Management
- Public Administration
- ESI research areas
- Economics & Business