Partial belief as a solution to the logical problem of holding simultaneous, contrary beliefs in self-deception research

K. Gibbins

doi:10.1017/S0140525X97360038

Back

Partial belief as a solution to the logical problem of holding simultaneous, contrary beliefs in self-deception research

Journal article

Open access

Peer reviewed

Partial belief as a solution to the logical problem of holding simultaneous, contrary beliefs in self-deception research

K. Gibbins

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol.20(1), pp.115-116

1997

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X97360038

Files and links (2)

pdf

partial_belief.pdfDownload View

Published (Version of Record) Open Access

url

Link to Published Version *Subscription may be requiredView

Abstract

A major worry in self-deception research has been the implication that people can hold a belief that something is true and false at the same time: a logical as well as a psychological impossibility. However, if beliefs are held with imperfect confidence, voluntary self-deception in the sense of seeking evidence to reject an unpleasant belief becomes entirely plausible and demonstrably real.

Details

Title: Partial belief as a solution to the logical problem of holding simultaneous, contrary beliefs in self-deception research
Authors/Creators: K. Gibbins (Author/Creator) - Murdoch University
Publication Details: Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol.20(1), pp.115-116
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Identifiers: 991005542584907891
Murdoch Affiliation: School of Psychology
Language: English
Resource Type: Journal article
Note: Commentary

Metrics

394 File views/ downloads

79 Record Views

InCites Highlights

These are selected metrics from InCites Benchmarking & Analytics tool, related to this output

Citation topics: 6 Social Sciences; 6.73 Social Psychology; 6.73.130 Cognitive Biases
Web Of Science research areas: Behavioral Sciences; Neurosciences; Psychology, Biological
ESI research areas: Neuroscience & Behavior