David T. Hill AM

This article examines the first two Indonesians to live in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) after the Korean War (1950–53), using their experiences (including as political exiles after 1965) to explore Indonesia’s bilateral relations with this most secretive of states. Their lives reveal much of the untold story of Indonesia’s unfolding relationship with the Kims’ dynastic state from Sukarno’s initial attraction until the return to democracy after his successor’s fall. Despite recent interest in the fate of Indonesian political exiles in Western Europe, USSR and China after 1965, relatively little critical analysis has appeared regarding those exiles in republics across the former Eastern Bloc (such as Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia), or elsewhere in Asia. Similarly, there is little attention given in Indonesia’s scholarly literature to bilateral relations with North Korea. This article attempts to address these lacunae by focusing on Indonesian political exiles in North Korea, analysing the factors which determined the options available to them during, and following, the Cold War, and their place in the bilateral relationship. In the nature of biographical studies, the article relies heavily on material provided by the individuals concerned and privileges their perspectives.

Several thousand Indonesians were in China on 1 October 1965, when six senior military officers were killed in Jakarta by the Thirtieth of September Movement (G30S) in a putsch blamed upon the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The event changed the lives of Indonesians—in China and in their homeland—irrevocably. This article examines the impact of bilateral state relations upon the fate of those Indonesian political exiles in China and assesses the role of the Beijing-based leadership of the PKI (known as the Delegation of the Central Committee) as it attempted to manage the party in exile. Oral and written accounts by individual exiles are drawn upon to illustrate the broader community experience and trauma of exile, which was particularly harsh during the Cultural Revolution. The fate of the Indonesian exiles during this tempestuous period of Chinese politics was exacerbated by the failure of the delegation and, ultimately, by the exiles’ eventual rejection by the Chinese state.

Since Joseph Nye introduced the concept of “Soft power” in his 1991 book, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, analysts have discussed states' efforts to exercise their influence by attracting and co-opting rather than coercing or using force. This paper will examine enrolments trends in Indonesian language in Australian universities, in the context of Indonesia's public diplomacy and Australian government educational policy. Enrolment data and trend analysis updates the 2012 National Report on Indonesian in Australian Universities: Strategies for a stronger future. Then, using statistics provided by a recent Newspoll commissioned by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the article explores Australian attitudes to Indonesia in the context of Indonesia's limited linguistic “soft power”. It concludes that the fluctuations in Indonesian language learning in Australia and Australian attitudes to Indonesia generally appear more influenced by Australian government policy than any conscious efforts by Indonesia to exercise “soft power”. It concludes that it is to the advantage of both countries that Indonesian language learning be better promoted and supported.

The thirteen essays in this volume come from Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Malaysia, South Africa, and Hawai‘i. With a shared focus on the specific local conditions that influence the ways in which life narratives are told, the authors engage with a variety of academic disciplines, including anthropology, history, media studies, and literature, to challenge claims that life writing is an exclusively Western phenomenon. Addressing the common desire to reflect on lived experience, the authors enlist interdisciplinary perspectives to interrogate the range of cultural forms available for representing and understanding lives.

Australia’s bilateral relationship with Indonesia is arguably our most important. With a population of approximately 240 million, Indonesia is the world’s third largest democracy, fourth most populous nation, and is home to both a rapidly expanding middle class and the largest Muslim community of any country in the world. Given Australia’s proximity to Indonesia and our environmental and security inter-dependence, a healthy working relationship with our northern neighbour is vital to both our present and future national interest. By some measures the relationship between Australia and Indonesia is strong. Jakarta hosts Australia’s largest embassy, our second largest defence representation and a substantial Australian Federal Police presence. Trade between the two countries has, historically, been modest – $12.9 billion in 2010 – with Indonesia ranking as only our thirteenth largest trading partner. However, it is a trade relationship that has been showing recent signs of vibrancy. Since 2006 two-way trade between the two countries has grown by an average of 9.7 per cent p.a. and, given Indonesia’s maintenance of respectable real GDP growth (6.1 per cent in 2010), trade between Australia and Indonesia is likely to continue to intensify in the years ahead. The International Monetary Fund projects Indonesia will achieve one of the fastest growth rates of the world’s 18 largest economies during 2009-2015, outstripping even the powerhouse economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China.

After coming to power in the wake of the 1 October 1965 putsch, Major-General Suharto and his self-proclaimed ‘New Order’ cut a swathe through the country’s newspapers. In a crackdown unlike anything the country has ever seen nearly one-third of all newspapers were shut down. As the New Order approaches its thirtieth anniversary, it is facing its greatest challenge since initially imposing its tight press policy: While surviving diminishing oil revenues, can it successfully develop an open national economy, yet still suppress growing demands for an unfettered media?