Sarah Withnall Howe

The following scene is probably all too familiar for law teachers: You are sitting at your desk surrounded by numerous exam scripts. To your right, a small pile of marked scripts; to your left, a daunting pile of unmarked ones (scattered in between are several empty coffee cups and various chocolate bar wrappers). With a sigh of exasperation, you throw your pen down, frustrated by how often you have written the same advice on your students’ scripts. And it’s too late to tell them that if they had actively engaged in the unit and its learning activities, they could have gained a better understanding of the law, and the skills needed to study and practice it (thereby minimising exam answer ‘mistakes’, which would have been immensely beneficial when it came time to produce sound exam answers)!

Anti-corruption watchdogs form an important part of integrity measures in Australia's system of government. Integrity theory places anti-corruption watchdogs in a fourth branch of government and as a part of a national integrity system as a way of understanding how they detect and prevent corruption and promote integrity. Integrity theory claims that an important part of the oversight of watchdogs occurs through judicial review of watchdog decisions by the courts. However, it fails to recognise the unique limitations when undertaking judicial review of watchdog decisions. This article submits that it is important to recognise these limitations to properly assess the effectiveness of a national integrity system and a fourth branch of government. The article explores the unique limitations of the court's ability to hold watchdogs to account and offers suggestions for managing these limitations.

This article examines the 2011 review of the Western Australian Local Government Standards Panel (LGSP) which was established in 2007. In particular this article focuses on the Review Committee’s recommendations in relation to the interaction between the LGSP and the Corruption and Crime Commission of Western Australia (CCC). The article acknowledges the value of Recommendation 4 and supports the Review Committee’s recommendation that a closer relationship between the LGSP and the CCC’s Corruption Prevention Directorate should exist. However, the article goes on to argue that despite what appears to be a contrary view being held by the Department of Local Government and LGSP, both of these bodies have a binding obligation to report a reasonable suspicion of misconduct to the CCC pursuant to s 28 of the Corruption and Crime Commission Act 2003 (WA). The article supports Recommendation 32 which advocates for consistency between the general principles guiding council member behaviour currently contained in the Rules of Conduct, the proposed new Uniform Code of Conduct and the CCC Act, s 4 definition of misconduct. Finally, this article argues that Recommendation 31, which proposes legislative changes which seemingly mirror the legislative scheme in Queensland under the Crime and Misconduct Act 2001 (Qld), are oversimplified and would be ineffective in the Western Australian context

Currently Western Australia has over 140 local government bodies, each headed by a Chief Executive Officer, staffed by multiple public officers and comprised of a number of elected councillors. These local governments are regulated by complex legislation and are overseen by the Department of Local Government who reports to the relevant Parliamentary Minister. Further to this, the relevant legislation creates a Local Government Standards Panel who can receive complaints about elected councillors and also allows for the State Administrative Tribunal to hear and determine some complaints against elected councillors. Local government in Western Australia is analogist to the multiheaded Hydra beast of Greek mythology; being that there are multiple participants within local government, each with their own capacity to make decisions which affect a wide array of stakeholders. It is against this backdrop that oversight bodies – such as Western Australia’s anti-corruption agency, the Corruption and Crime Commission – must attempt to monitor corruption issues within local government. This article will argue that the multiple heads of local government within Western Australia hinders the monitoring of local government corruption issues. It will also argue that these multiple heads have the potential to foster corruption practices within local government. Suggestions to overcome these issues will be made.