Tobias Ide

While climate change is increasingly recognized as a driver of conflict risks, most research focuses on past correlations, hence limiting our ability to project future climate-related security risks. We use machine learning techniques to predict the spatiotemporal dynamics of conflict risks and estimate the human population that would be exposed to these risks in the 2030s, 2040s, and 2050s. Our results demonstrate that climate change is associated with increasing risks of conflict over the next decades and that the change of projected spatial and temporal distribution of conflict risk will be heterogeneous, depending on conflict types and climate scenarios. We estimate that 0.5-1.7 billion people may live at high-risk zones of conflict across sub-Saharan Africa by the 2050s, which is an increase of at least 391 million compared to today. Detecting such risks early provides sufficient time to plan ahead and implement mitigation strategies.

Interest in the impact of disasters on conflict risks is burgeoning. This is particularly the case for the Indo-Pacific region, which is highly vulnerable to disasters and experiences geopolitical competition as well as several armed conflicts. So far, the literature has predominantly focussed on the impact of disasters on higher conflict risks. We argue that considering the option that disasters can (temporarily) reduce conflict risks would benefit research, politics, and practice. To illustrate this argument, we focus on two possible mechanisms. First, disasters can catalyse short-term declines in armed conflict intensity by providing constraints to the conflict parties. This mechanism is supported by evidence from the civil wars in Kashmir (after the 2005 earthquake) and Bangladesh (after cyclone Sidr in 2007). Second, disasters provide opportunities for diplomacy between states, which can in turn reduce conflict risks, even though such diplomacy might suffer from a politicisation of disaster relief. Evidence from Australian disaster diplomacy after the 2018 Sulawesi earthquake (Indonesia) and the 2022 volcanic eruption in Tonga supports this mechanism. A more comprehensive, less conflict-focussed ontology would benefit further research on disasters and conflict.

The climate-conflict nexus has attracted significant academic and policy interest, but such discussions are often based on a narrow conception of the phenomenon. This article proposes a broader understanding of climate conflicts, which can be related to (1) the direct impacts of climate inaction (e.g., activism for ambitious climate change mitigation), (2) the direct impacts of climate action (e.g., resistance against fossil fuel subsidy cuts), (3) the indirect impacts of climate inaction (e.g., communal tensions over water in vulnerable locations), and (4) the indirect impacts of climate action (e.g., opposition against mining for renewable energies). After assessing existing evidence on these four types of climate conflicts, I outline the benefits of such a broader understanding: It reveals that climate conflicts are widespread and inevitable, including in the Global North. Such a rethinking enables an integrative analysis of the manifold teleconnections and trade-offs in the climate-conflict nexus, hence highlighting the relevance of conflict sensitivity in climate policy and environmental governance. Finally, this broader understanding of climate conflicts enables productive exchanges across different streams of research, including securitisation, political ecology, and decolonial approaches.

The potential impacts of climate change on violent conflict are high on the agenda of scholars and policy makers. This article reviews existing literature to clarify the relationship between climate change and conflict risk, focusing on the roles of temperature and precipitation. While some debate remains, substantial evidence shows that climate change increases conflict risk under specific conditions. We examine four key pathways through which climate affects conflict: (i) economic shocks, (ii), agricultural decline, (iii) natural resources competition, and (iv) migration. Key gaps include limited long-term data, insufficient integrated studies, and the inadequate understanding of causal mechanisms, necessitating transdisciplinary research that addresses social vulnerability and underlying pathways.

Nurses play key roles in dealing with pandemics yet are often conceived solely as “technical” experts without political agency. This study conducts the first global comparative analysis of COVID-19-related protests of nurses and other frontline health workers, with a focus on the first 18 months of the pandemic. We draw on quantitative and qualitative data on nurses’ protests and protest drivers. Results show that such protests were widespread: We identify 3515 events in 90 countries, with several regional hotspots existing. The most common reasons for protests were poor working conditions and insufficient workplace safety, followed by wider social issues like poverty and racism. For most of the time period under consideration, protests demanding access to vaccinations (a rarely explored phenomenon) were more widespread than anti-vaccination events. Protest frequency was highest in countries with high COVID-19-related mortality rates, high levels of human development, and strong social movements at the onset of the pandemic. Recognising the key role of nurses as political actors would help to improve health policies and to maintain a capable healthcare workforce, particularly during acute crises like pandemics.

Environmental change and armed conflict are major challenges of the 21st century. Meanwhile, scholars and practitioners increasingly recognize the environment and natural resources as not only sources of conflict and violence but also as potential means for peacebuilding. While research on both fronts is rapidly progressing, the literature on the climate–conflict nexus and environmental peacebuilding has remained disconnected, although climate conflicts will (and already) require peacebuilding efforts. We address this gap by identifying overlaps that open opportunities for an integrated research agenda. Particularly, we call for a deeper exploration of the local dimensions of climate-related conflicts and environmental peacebuilding. Local actors, knowledge, networks, and identities shape peacebuilding outcomes and are key in building climate-resilient peace. However, romanticizing the local sphere might also mask significant inequalities, power differences, and ethical concerns.

Research on the impact of disasters on conflict risks is burgeoning. We conduct a systematic review of peer-reviewed studies on the topic published between 2000 and 2022 to take stock of existing evidence and identify knowledge gaps. The large majority of studies (78 %) provide at least some evidence that (natural hazard-related) disasters affect the risk of larger-scale political conflicts. 55 % of the studies find that disasters increase conflict risks, with support being particularly strong for low-intensity conflicts. 23 % of the studies argue that disasters decrease conflict risks. The impact of disasters on conflict risks is strongly dependent on context factors like previous political instability, socio-economic inequality, effective governance, or external support. This serves as a reminder that the disaster-conflict nexus is deeply political. We also consider the causal mechanisms connecting disasters to conflict risks. Studies provide most support for the mechanisms of relative deprivation (for higher conflict risks) as well as for disaster diplomacy and resource constraints (for lower conflict risks). The findings vary considerably when distinguishing between different disaster types and forms of conflicts. Furthermore, we note a geographic imbalance: Almost all research is focussing on Africa and Asia, while the large majority of authors comes from the Global North.

The frequency and intensity of disasters is on the rise. Many countries in the Indo-Pacific region are highly vulnerable to natural hazards like droughts, earthquakes, floods, and cyclones. Accordingly, demand for Defence involvement in disaster response will grow. At the same time, great power competition in the region is intensifying, while several governments are challenged by insurgent groups and extremist movements. We study how disasters contribute to political unrest and fragility, but also analyse disaster-related opportunities for international cooperation and diplomacy. Disasters frequently fuel discontent with the government. This can result in protests and declines in government legitimacy, opening, up spaces for extremist movements and political instability. The impact of disasters on civil war is more mixed. Insurgents face significant challenges in dealing with disasters, but they can also recruit among those deprived by or aggrieved due to the disaster. Disaster risk reduction as a whole-of-government approach (including Defence) can hence be crucial for a strategy to deny access for domestic extremist groups. Cooperation with other countries in the Indo-Pacific affected by disasters, including relief provision by Defence, plays an important role in building partnerships with other countries in the region. Particularly when well-coordinated with international partners and relevant local actors, disaster responses can enhance Australia's national interest.

Including women into their ranks offers non-state armed groups advantages in terms of mobilisation, intelligence gathering, and establishing ties with civilians. However, especially in conservative societies, this inclusion of could also cause backlash from group members and supporters. While several previous studies analyse why rebels choose to recruit female combatants, limited attention has been paid to women in non-combat roles. I address this gap by studying the drivers of women’s inclusion into rebel groups as non-fighting members, hence contributing to wider efforts to bring gender-sensitive approaches to research on security and violence. Specifically, I conduct a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) of 118 groups in the period 1989–2015. The results indicate that a conjunction of supply-side factors (female unemployment, gender inequality) and demand-side factors (leftist ideology, territorial control, military strength) drive female non-combat participation in rebel groups. The causal impact of women’s marginalisation is highly context-dependent: Leftist rebels’ calls for gender equality are appealing to (particularly poor and excluded) women. Yet, rebels with high demand for skilled labour prefer to recruit non-marginalised women that received at least some job training.