Tobias Ide

Despite growing interest in environmental peacebuilding in recent years, there has been limited research exploring the conditions that contribute to local environmental peacebuilding. Existing empirical studies are predominantly qualitative single-case studies, valued for their theoretical insights but criticized for their limited external validity. Cross-case comparisons, although scarce, often rely on secondary data, leading to definitional and methodological inconsistencies. This study addresses this gap by employing multi-site fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to identify under what conditions local environmental cooperation is initiated and sustained over renewable resources in politically fragile contexts. We collected primary data through semistructured interviews on 22 intercommunal cases in which two communities engaged either in cooperation or in conflict over water access points in Puntland State, Somalia, covering the period from 2015 to 2023. The results highlight the relevance of the simultaneous presence of three conditions: preexisting trust, mutual interdependence, and traditional institutions. These conditions do not operate in isolation; they interact to enable cooperation and build peace related to the environment and natural resources. Our findings suggest that even in politically fragile, environmentally stressed, and highly climate-vulnerable places, local communities can find cooperative solutions to renewable resource disputes if specific conditions are met.

Concerns about climate change and conflict are ubiquitous. Systematic research on the climate-conflict nexus in the Pacific is lacking, despite the region’s high vulnerability to climate change as well as several past episodes of political instability. Using a new dataset, we analyze the impact of climate-related disasters and temperature extremes on social conflict events in Fiji, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. According to theoretical expectations, climate change should engender more social conflicts, for instance due to intensified grievances, resource competition (especially about land), and rural-to-urban migration. The results indicate that in the three countries studied, disaster shocks and temperature extremes do not noticeably affect conflict risks, even after controlling political, economic, and environmental context factors. Major cities, commonly considered most prone to climate-related conflicts in the region, do also not experience higher conflict risks following disasters. These findings indicate that Pacific Island countries may be more resilient to climate-related conflict risks than commonly assumed.

The world's social and environmental systems are currently experiencing an increase in the number of conflicts and irreversible human-induced changes. While destabilizing, these changes offer opportunities to advance the science involved to promote peace and sustainability. This forum outlines 12 key research agendas essential for advancing our understanding of the peace-sustainability nexus: global challenges (including the Anthropocene, disasters, and migration); socio-ecological systems (such as oceans, water, and heritage); policy solutions (focused on cities, food, and geoengineering); and guiding principles for peace and sustainability (emphasizing gender, justice, and plurality). Each agenda echoes the normative elements of peace and sustainability as processes while situating them within specific contexts. This approach works within limitations when mobilizing capacities to minimize unintended negative impacts of well-intentioned solutions. Beyond examining how each area either strengthens or weakens the relationship between peace and sustainability, this forum also encourages future research to explore the interconnections that might illuminate pathways for meaningful action. The brief overview of research trends and knowledge gaps can support future work in considering the capacities, constraints, and contexts underpinning the peace-sustainability nexus.

Armed conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza are very visible reminders of the severe negative impacts that armed conflicts have on the environment. Yet, despite knowledge of singular environmental issues and specific country contexts, the magnitude, temporal, and multiscalar impact of armed conflict on broader environmental performance has not been quantified. This knowledge gap limits the ability to design broad and targeted measures of environmental protection during armed conflict as well as rehabilitation in the post-conflict period. Here, we conduct the first global study on the environmental impacts of armed conflict. Our analysis shows that countries with an armed conflict have a significantly worse environmental performance. Armed conflict length and severity are both negatively affecting the environmental performance of countries. Even after an armed conflict ends, countries need about 20 to 30 years to recover in terms of environmental performance. This finding is particularly concerning when considering the risk of conflict recurrence due to environmental stress and bad natural resource management. Taken together, this demonstrates the urgency of measures to protect the environment during armed conflicts and in post-conflict settings.

Interest in the impact of disasters on conflict risks is burgeoning. This is particularly the case for the Indo-Pacific region, which is highly vulnerable to disasters and experiences geopolitical competition as well as several armed conflicts. So far, the literature has predominantly focussed on the impact of disasters on higher conflict risks. We argue that considering the option that disasters can (temporarily) reduce conflict risks would benefit research, politics, and practice. To illustrate this argument, we focus on two possible mechanisms. First, disasters can catalyse short-term declines in armed conflict intensity by providing constraints to the conflict parties. This mechanism is supported by evidence from the civil wars in Kashmir (after the 2005 earthquake) and Bangladesh (after cyclone Sidr in 2007). Second, disasters provide opportunities for diplomacy between states, which can in turn reduce conflict risks, even though such diplomacy might suffer from a politicisation of disaster relief. Evidence from Australian disaster diplomacy after the 2018 Sulawesi earthquake (Indonesia) and the 2022 volcanic eruption in Tonga supports this mechanism. A more comprehensive, less conflict-focussed ontology would benefit further research on disasters and conflict.

The climate-conflict nexus has attracted significant academic and policy interest, but such discussions are often based on a narrow conception of the phenomenon. This article proposes a broader understanding of climate conflicts, which can be related to (1) the direct impacts of climate inaction (e.g., activism for ambitious climate change mitigation), (2) the direct impacts of climate action (e.g., resistance against fossil fuel subsidy cuts), (3) the indirect impacts of climate inaction (e.g., communal tensions over water in vulnerable locations), and (4) the indirect impacts of climate action (e.g., opposition against mining for renewable energies). After assessing existing evidence on these four types of climate conflicts, I outline the benefits of such a broader understanding: It reveals that climate conflicts are widespread and inevitable, including in the Global North. Such a rethinking enables an integrative analysis of the manifold teleconnections and trade-offs in the climate-conflict nexus, hence highlighting the relevance of conflict sensitivity in climate policy and environmental governance. Finally, this broader understanding of climate conflicts enables productive exchanges across different streams of research, including securitisation, political ecology, and decolonial approaches.

This is an interview with environmental journalist Peter Schwartzstein. In the interview, Schwartzstein discusses how states are increasingly securitizing and weaponizing climate change and the environment. This can happen directly, for instance when militaries prepare for climate change or when governments use the environment in strategic ways to cover up their actions. But there are also indirect ways, such as artificial NGOs that serve governmental interests. Schwartzstein further discusses opportunities and challenges for environmental security journalists, including the need to work on the ground and the often-complex intersections between climate and conflict. He identifies declining state legitimacy as the most concerning development in the environmental security field in the coming years.

While climate change is increasingly recognized as a driver of conflict risks, most research focuses on past correlations, hence limiting our ability to project future climate-related security risks. We use machine learning techniques to predict the spatiotemporal dynamics of conflict risks and estimate the human population that would be exposed to these risks in the 2030s, 2040s, and 2050s. Our results demonstrate that climate change is associated with increasing risks of conflict over the next decades and that the change of projected spatial and temporal distribution of conflict risk will be heterogeneous, depending on conflict types and climate scenarios. We estimate that 0.5-1.7 billion people may live at high-risk zones of conflict across sub-Saharan Africa by the 2050s, which is an increase of at least 391 million compared to today. Detecting such risks early provides sufficient time to plan ahead and implement mitigation strategies.