Anne Schwenkenbecher

Determining appropriate mechanisms for transferring and translating research into policy has become a major concern for researchers (knowledge producers) and policymakers (knowledge users) worldwide. This has led to the emergence of a new function of brokering between researchers and policymakers, and a new type of agent called Knowledge Broker. Understanding these complex multi-agent interactions is critical for an efficient knowledge brokering practice during any given policymaking process. Here, we present (1) the current diversity of knowledge broker groups working in the field of biosecurity and environmental management; (2) the incentives linking the different agents involved in the process (knowledge producers, knowledge brokers and knowledge users); and (3) the gaps, needs and challenges to better understand this social ecosystem. We also propose alternatives aimed at improving transparency and efficiency, including future scenarios where the role of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies may become predominant in knowledge-brokering activities.

Evidence-based policy (EBP) has become widely embraced for its commitment to greater uptake of scientific knowledge in policymaking. But what legitimizes EBP and in what respect are evidence-based policymaking practices better than other policymaking practices? In this article, we distinguish and refine three potential legitimizers of EBP. We suggest that evidence-based policymaking practices are better because they “follow the science,” because they focus on “what works,” or because they “follow the rules.” We discuss some consequences, for advocates of EBP, of consciously adopting one or other of these legitimizers. Finally, we examine whether it is appropriate to switch from advocating for EBP to advocating for evidence-informed policy.

Background
Evidence-based policymaking is a paradigm aimed at increasing the use of evidence by actors involved in policymaking processes. The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted a heavy reliance on emerging evidence for policymaking during emergencies.

Objective
This study describes the focus and types of evidence in journal articles self-described as relevant to policymaking using the COVID-19 pandemic as a case study, identifying gaps in evidence and highlighting author stated perceived biases specifically in evidence-based policy making.

Design
Evidence mapping.

Data sources
We systematically searched SCOPUS, PubMed and LexisNexis for literature identifying policy-relevant evidence available on the COVID-19 pandemic.

Eligibility criteria
The study included only peer-reviewed literature identified as ‘article’, ‘book chapter’, ‘review’ covering the period from January 2020 to December 2022. Inclusion criteria required that articles have an abstract, authorship attribution and are written in English.

Data extraction and synthesis
A minimum of two authors independently extracted and coded for every level and final outputs were compared for consistency.

Results
A total of 213 articles met the inclusion criteria and were reviewed in this study. Lead authorship affiliations were from 50 countries with 70% of the outputs from developed economies including USA (20.2%), UK (18.3%) and Australia (7.5%). The most common purpose of the articles was the presentation of research findings the authors considered of relevance to policy (60.1%), followed by work that examined the impact of policy (28.6%) or highlighted or supported a policy need (22.5%), while some papers had multiple stated purposes. The most common challenges in policymaking identified by the authors of the reviewed papers were process failures and poor evidence utilisation during policymaking.

Conclusions
The evidence map identified the need for an interdisciplinary policy approach involving relevant stakeholders and driven by quality research as a progressive step towards prevention of future public health crises/pandemics.

There seems to be a striking parallel between the features of psychopaths and those of agential groups, including states and corporations. Psychopaths are often thought to lack some of the capacities that are constitutive of moral agency. Two features of psychopaths are commonly identified as grounds for limiting their moral responsibility: (i) their lack of relevant emotional capacities and (ii) their flawed rational capacities. Roughly, the first argument is that the lack of moral emotions such as sympathy, guilt, or shame negatively impacts moral perception and therewith an agent's capacity for moral reasoning. The second argument is that psychopaths are diminished in their agency as such, not just in their moral agency; they are erratic and impulsive and show other significant failures of rationality. Using the 2020 Juukan Gorge disaster in Western Australia as a case study, I conclude that deliberate or reckless corporate irrationality cannot be grounds for diminished corporate moral responsibility. Corporate agents are chiefly responsible for core aspects of their moral agency, including their internal epistemic structures and decision‐making processes. They have obligations to establish or maintain internal epistemic integrity and consistency.

When evidence-based policymaking is so often mired in disagreement and controversy, how can we know if the process is meeting its stated goals? We develop a novel mathematical model to study disagreements about adequate knowledge utilization, like those regarding wild horse culling, shark drumlines and facemask policies during pandemics. We find that, when stakeholders disagree, it is frequently impossible to tell whether any party is at fault. We demonstrate the need for a distinctive kind of transparency in evidence-based policymaking, which we call transparency of reasoning. Such transparency is critical to the success of the evidence-based policy movement, as without it, we will be unable to tell whether in any instance a policy was in fact based on evidence.

In order to make sense of collective doxastic reasons we need an account of group belief. Once we arrive at a more nuanced understanding of group belief it turns out that for some group beliefs we need not invoke collective epistemic reasons. However, we do need them for better understanding how and why different social identity groups will hold beliefs whose evidence-base is irreducibly social and tied to them being that kind of group. This short article is a commentary on Veli Mitova's 2022 article "The collective epistemic reasons of social-identity groups".

‘Wicked problems’ are tricky to solve because of their many interconnected components and a lack of any single optimal solution (1,2). At the science–policy interface, all problems can look wicked: research exposes the complexity that is relevant to designing, executing and implementing policy fit for ambitious human needs (3,4). Expertise in philosophical research can help to navigate that complexity (5)...

Marine ecosystems are under increasing pressure from human activity, yet successful management relies on knowledge. The evidence-based policy (EBP) approach has been promoted on the grounds that it provides greater transparency and consistency by relying on 'high quality' information. However, EBP also creates epistemic responsibilities. Decision-making where limited or no empirical evidence exists, such as is often the case in marine systems, creates epistemic obligations for new information acquisition. We argue that philosophical approaches can inform the science-policy interface. Using marine biosecurity examples, we specifically examine the epistemic challenges in the acquisition and acceptance of evidence to inform policy, discussing epistemic due care and biases in consideration of evidence.