Rajat Ganguly

The Indian military is the world’s fourth largest after the US, Russia and China. In the immediate aftermath of India’s independence from British rule, however, it was hard to imagine that in the span of six decades, a poverty-stricken, fragmented and deeply traumatised country would emerge as a military powerhouse. How and why has this transformation taken place? Has India’s growing military prowess resulted in a more robust and adventurist foreign policy, particularly within the South Asian region? What does India’s rapid military transformation, particularly the Indian Navy, in the twenty-first century say about India’s perception of threats to national security? In this article, I argue that the Indian military’s expansion and modernisation has happened in phases, mainly as a reaction to threatening developments within the surrounding region, the evolving global strategic environment and the perceptions and decisions taken by India’s political elites. I argue, further, that as India’s military prowess and self-confidence have grown, Indian leaders have at times felt tempted to flex the military muscles, particularly in low-intensity regional conflicts, but not always with expected results. I conclude that in the twenty-first century, the Indian military, particularly the Indian Navy, is undergoing rapid expansion and transformation. This suggests that in addition to threats coming across the western and northern land borders with Pakistan and China respectively, India’s security planners envisage a growing threat to national security emanating from the deep waters of the Bay of Bengal, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.

After nearly 30 years in power, the Hosni Mubarak regime in Egypt, considered by many to be the strongest in the Arab world, collapsed suddenly in February 2011 after a mere 18 days of street protests. In this article, we try to explain the puzzling collapse of the Mubarak regime using regime transition theory. We argue that the Mubarak regime’s collapse came about as a result of four key developments, none of which were sufficient to cause the regime’s collapse, but when coalesced together exposed the regime’s lack of coercive and persuasive powers, thereby hastening its demise. We conclude that regime transition theory, developed to explain the third wave of democratisations in the 1970s and 1980s, is still relevant in explaining transitions from authoritarian rule.

India’s strategy towards the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka shifted over the course of the conflict from a strategy of diffusion to a strategy of mediation and then finally to a strategy of suppression—each strategy marking a distinct phase in the conflict. While India’s strategy shifted at different phases in the Sri Lankan conflict, the foundation on which the strategies were based—considerations of national security—remained constant. The central argument of the article is that consideration of national security, in both its internal and external dimensions, has been the main driver of India’s strategy towards the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka. The empirical analysis confirms the strength of the realist dictum that national interest understood primarily in terms of national security plays the pivotal role in states’ foreign policy behaviour.

India is at a crossroads today. While it is fast emerging as a global power with a vibrant democratic polity, a robust economy and a nuclear-weapons capable military, the country is also witnessing a growing polarisation between the rich and poor and between urban and rural areas, a rise in communal tensions, large numbers of suicides by impoverished and indebted farmers and a spurt in terrorist activities and attacks by various disgruntled organisations and groups. Of these various challenges, as attested to by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh himself, the most dangerous threat to India's territorial integrity, prosperity and wellbeing has come from the Naxalite insurgency or ‘people's war’ that is manifest in large areas of eastern, central and southern India. But what factors account for the formation and persistence of Naxalite insurgency in India? What are the key objectives of the Naxalites and why is violence directed against the Indian State? And how has the Indian State (both central and state governments) responded to the Naxalite insurgency and with what effect? These are the main research questions that we attempt to answer in this paper. We put forward two broad arguments. First, the Naxalite insurgency in India is the latest manifestation of peasant struggles caused by grinding poverty, exploitation and inequality that have prevailed in rural areas for centuries. What sustains these struggles to this day is the fact that socio-economic conditions in rural areas have changed little and the policies followed by the post-independent Indian State have generally failed to mitigate rural problems. Second, the Naxalite insurgency has emerged as the most dangerous threat mainly due to the movement's spatial spread, growing support base in tribal and backward areas and enhanced fighting capabilities. The Indian State has viewed the movement as a ‘law and order’ problem and responded with force. But a ‘law and order’ approach to the Naxalite insurgency is unlikely to produce a lasting resolution of the problem, since it would not effectively redress deep-rooted grievances felt by a majority of India's rural poor for decades.

In recent years, minority ethnic groups in various states in India have politically mobilized in support of separate statehood status within the Indian federation to be achieved mainly by breaking-up the existing states in which they live. In this article I analyze the main reasons behind Gorkha nationalism in West Bengal, which led to the demand for a separate “Gorkhaland” and the formation of the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council (DGHC), and to assess the impact of the DGHC with the aim to determine, as far as possible, the likelihood of the Gorkhaland agitation and demand being resurrected in the near future. Over the past several decades, the attention of scholars, practitioners and the national and international media has remained focused on Indian states like Jammu and Kashmir, Assam and the Punjab where violent ethno-secessionist insurgencies erupted and raged on. In the process, a slightly different but equally important development that affected several other states in India has remained largely hidden or ignored—that is, the political mobilization of minority ethnic groups in support of separate statehood status within the Indian federation to be achieved mainly by breaking up the existing states in which they lived. Several of these ethnopolitical movements have recently succeeded in their quest for separate statehood after the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government in New Delhi authorized the break-up of Madhya Pradesh to create Chattisgarh, Bihar to create Jharkhand, and Uttar Pradesh to create Uttaranchal. While these successes are noteworthy, equally striking is the relatively large number of similar movements that are waiting in the wings in several other states. It is in this context that the Gorkhaland agitation in West Bengal has acquired significance.

In the 1990s the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka had acquired the reputation of an orphaned and dirty war. Hence, there was widespread support when in the new millennium Norway tried to facilitate a dialogue between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the main Tamil insurgent group, and the Sri Lankan government. The peace process led to a ceasefire agreement and six rounds of face‐to‐face meetings. Although progress was understandably slow, a political framework that allowed Tamil national self‐determination while simultaneously protecting Sri Lankan sovereignty and territorial integrity seemed near. However, by late 2003–early 2004, such optimism lay shattered and a return to the days of warfare seemed a real possibility. In this paper, I offer an explanation for the onset of peace talks, assess its achievements and explore whether the peace process is still salvageable or a return to warfare is more likely to mark the future.

The endemic instability and insecurity in South Asia continue to stem from the unresolved Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. Indo-Pak hostility has resulted in the bifurcation of the erstwhile princely state and led to two major wars and several near misses in the past. With the onset of a secessionist ethnoreligious insurgency in Indian Kashmir in 1989, a proxy war developed between India and Pakistan, which brought bilateral relations between the two states to its nadir, contributed directly to an arms race and nuclear weapons testing in the subcontinent, undermined regional integration efforts, and resulted in gross human rights violations in the state. This Indo-Pak proxy war eventually led to a short conventional war along the line of control (LoC) in Kashmir in 1999. Although contained through intense international pressure, it momentarily raised fears of a catastrophic nuclear exchange. Resolving the secessionist insurgency in Indian Kashmir and the wider Indo-Pak dispute over the region has thus never been more urgent than it is today. This article analyses the origins and dynamics of the secessionist insurgency in Indian Kashmir, its impact on Indo- Pakistan relations, and the prospects for its resolution.

Several cases have emerged recently in which ethnic groups have blamed the resource-extracting activities of multinational corporations (MNCs) in their 'homeland' for the outbreak of violent conflict with the state. In this article, causal conditions identified by three existing theories of ethnic political mobilization are linked to the resource-extracting activities of MNCs in order to ascertain how such MNC activity may stir up and exacerbate ethnic conflict in states and regions where they operate. The theoretical framework is then applied to three empirical case studies.

The aim of this article is to analyze ethnosecessionist mobilization ‐ that is, political mobilization in support of national independence by breaking away from the existing state. The author tests the applicability of theories of ethnic political mobilization in explaining ethnosecessionist tendencies in South Asia in the 1980s. The causal variables that have a bearing on ethnic political mobilization are identified; using binary coding, each causal variable is linked with the outcome variable for each case selected for study in order to reveal the various causal combinations of the phenomenon; and using Boolean methodology, the various causal combinations are reduced to determine the minimum causal conjunctures of ethnosecessionism in South Asia, which can be related to the key causal requirements of the different theories of ethnic political mobilization to determine which theories are more applicable in explaining ethnosecessionist tendencies.

Secession is ‘the withdrawal, from an existing state and its central government, of part of this state, the withdrawing part consisting of citizens and the territory they occupy’. In effect, it is a narrower sub-category of the broader concept of separatism—which includes irredentism, devolution, autonomy, and other types of limited self-determination—in the sense that the ultimate objective of a secessionist movement is to acquire international acceptance and recognition as a sovereign member of the community of states. The task is undoubtedly difficult and it ¡s generally believed that to accomplish it secessionists urgently need (and usually do seek) military and politico-diplomatic support from other states in the international system. Since most states consider secession to be an illegal act and resist it with force if necessary, secessionists must be ready and able to engage in military confrontation in order to neutralize the central government’s opposition to secession. Being usually the weaker side, most secessionists therefore come to depend upon outside military help. On the other hand, politico- diplomatic support and recognition from other states is crucial if secessionists are to overcome the pro-state bias of the international community. Thus conventional wisdom dictates that a secessionist movement’s durability and international acceptability depends upon its ability to acquire partisan support from other states in the international system.